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Spain and World War I: The Logic of Neutrality 
Centenary of a Cataclysm 
Metaphorically, darkness descended over Europe in the summer of 1914. The Great 
War was a cataclysm that resulted in eight and a half millions deaths, reshaped the 
map of the continent, and initiated a period of unprecedented socio-political 
radicalism described by Eric Hobsbawm as “an age of catastrophe”.1 However, 
when focusing on the case of Spain, Manuel Espadas Burgos noted in 2000 that it 
was still one of the chapters in her recent history that most needed research.2 
  In fact, although some important works, whose chronology often 
transcended the framework of the Great War, had already been published,3 it was 
not until 2002 that the first monographic study of the subject in all its complexity and 
context appeared.4 Ever since, this relative dearth of literature has been gradually 
corrected. Moreover, several academic congresses have taken place and new and 
excellent works have appeared with occasion of the centenary. Within this new 
bibliography, the field of international relations and diplomacy stands out. We now 
have acquired a very accurate idea of the activities of the belligerent nations in 
                                                          
1 Eric HOBSBAWM: Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-91, London, Penguin, 1994, pp. 
6-7. 
2 Manuel ESPADAS BURGOS: “España y la Primera Guerra Mundial”, Javier TUSELL, Juan AVILÉS, 
and Rosa PARDO (coords.): La política exterior de España en el siglo XX, Madrid, Biblioteca New, 2000, p. 
97. The same conclusion is reached in Maximiliano FUENTES CODERA: “Presentación” (La Gran 
Guerra de los Intelectuales), Ayer, 91 (2013), pp. 21-23; and Carolina GARCÍA SANZ: “La Gran Guerra 
en su centenario”, Ayer, 95 (2014), pp. 252-253. 
3  For instance, Juan Antonio LACOMBA: La crisis española de 1917, Málaga, Ciencia Nueva, 1970; 
Fernando DÍAZ PLAJA, Francófilos y Germanófilos, Barcelona, Dopesa, 1973; Gerald MEAKER: The 
Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-23, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1974 and, “A Civil War of 
Words”, Hans A. SCHMITT (ed.): Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-1923, Charlottesville, 
University of Virginia Press, 1988; Carlos FORCADELL: Parlamentarismo y bolchevización. El movimiento 
obrero español, 1914-1918, Barcelona, Crítica, 1978; Carolyn P. BOYD: Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain, 
Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1979; Ron M. CARDEN: German Policy Toward Neutral 
Spain, 1914-18, New York, Garland, 1987. 
4 Francisco J. ROMERO SALVADÓ: España 1914-18, Entre la Guerra y la revolución, Barcelona, Crítica, 
2002 (translated from Spain 1914-18: Between the War and the Revolution, London, Routledge, 1999). Its 
theses have been updated in posterior works: “Fatal Neutrality: Pragmatism or Capitulation? Spain's 
Foreign Policy during the Great War”, European History Quarterly, 33 (2003); “The Great War and the 
Crisis of Liberalism in Spain, 1916-1917”, The Historical Journal, 46 (2003); The Foundations of Civil War. 
Revolution, Social Conflict and Reaction in Spain, London, Routledge, 2008; and with Angel SMITH (eds.): 
The Agony of Spanish Liberalism. From Revolution to Dictatorship, 1913-1923, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2010. 
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Spain, their control and manipulation of the press, their spy networks, the activities 
of their submarines, etc.5 
 This article analyses how Spain’s decision to remain officially neutral during 
the war should be seen as fundamentally logical for two reasons. On the one hand, 
Spain’s socio-economic and military reality painted a picture of a country ill 
prepared to engage in the conflict. On the other hand, political leaders had little 
room to manoeuvre, as Spain was practically surrounded by the Allies and yet most 
of the ruling institutions (armed forces, Church, and court) were more or less openly 
favourable to the Central Powers. However, Spain’s neutrality, far from being a 
static concept, underwent different phases and was even in some moments 
apparently (though never genuinely) at risk. In the process, the nature of Spain’s 
neutrality evolved over the course of the war in response to a change in belligerent 
nations’ attitudes from one of initial respect and understanding to one of increasing 
contempt. 
 Fernando García Sanz has suggested that neutrality was a mere fiction: “Spain 
was neither allowed nor wanted to be neutral”.6 It is true that the country could not 
remain isolated from the war’s devastating consequences. Spain became a minor 
theatre of operations and, in turn, suffered a significant erosion of sovereignty, 
freedom of trade, and control over coasts and territorial waters. At the same time, 
the ruling liberal order underwent a crisis of hegemony that represented the regional 
                                                          
5 The state of the question can be found in Maximiliano FUENTES CODERA and CAROLINA GARCÍA 
SANZ: “España and la Gran Guerra: un análisis historiográfico a la luz del centenario”, Índice Histórico 
Español, 128 (2015), pp. 97-130. A summary of publications since 2002 should include: Juan PANDO: 
Un rey para la esperanza: La España humanitaria de Alfonso XIII en la Gran Guerra, Madrid, Temas de hoy, 
2002; Javier PONCE MARRERO: Canarias en la Gran Guerra, 1914-1918, Tenerife, Cabildo de Gran 
Canaria, 2006, and “Propaganda and Politics: Germany and Spanish Public Opinion in World War I”, 
Troy R.E. PADDOCK (ed.): World War I and Propaganda, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2014; Carolina GARCÍA 
SANZ: La Primera Guerra Mundial en el Estrecho de Gibraltar. Economía, política y relaciones internacionales, 
Madrid, CSIC, 2012; Miguel Ángel MARTORELL: “No fue aquello solamente una guerra, fue una 
revolución: España y la Primera Guerra Mundial”, Historia y Política, 26 (2011); Rosa PARDO: “España 
ante el conflicto bélico de 1914-1918: ¿Una espléndida neutralidad?”, Salvador FORNER (ed.): 
Coyuntura Internacional y Política Española, Madrid, Biblioteca New, 2010; Eduardo GONZÁLEZ 
CALLEJA and Paul AUBERT: Nidos de espías. España, Francia y la I Guerra Mundial, Madrid, Alianza 
Editorial, 2014; Fernando GARCÍA SANZ: España en la Gran Guerra. Espías, diplomáticos y traficantes, 
Madrid, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2014; Maximiliano FUENTES CODERA: España en la Primera Guerra 
Mundial: una movilización cultural, Madrid, Akal, 2014; Francisco MORENTE and Javier RODRIGO 
(eds.): Tierras de nadie. La Primera Guerra Mundial y sus consecuencias, Granada, Comares, 2014. 
6 Fernando GARCÍA SANZ: España…, pp. 13, 32. 
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version of the upheaval that engulfed Europe during the interwar years. 
Nevertheless, at a formal level and despite internal tensions and foreign 
provocations, neutrality endured until the end of the war, and Spain was 
consequently spared from the human and material devastation that belligerence 
would have entailed. 
Official Neutrality 
On 7 August 1914, the state’s official bulletin published a royal decree stating Spain’s 
strict neutrality in the unfolding continental conflict. The correspondence between 
the then prime minister, Eduardo Dato, and his former leader and now head of a 
dissident faction of the Conservative Party, Antonio Maura, clarified the logic 
behind the decision: lack of material resources, absence of treaties with the 
belligerent powers,7 and the hope to one day preside over a mediation process. Dato 
even emphasized that only an ultimatum or flagrant aggression could prompt Spain 
to abandon its position of neutrality.8 
 As Manuel Azaña pointed out in 1917, neutrality was not a policy freely 
chosen but imposed by reality.9 It simply reflected the economic weakness, military 
impotence and, the marginal status of Spain in Europe. Any remaining pretension of 
still being a great power had vanished after the colonial trauma of 1898 and the glaring 
failures of a new colonial adventure in Morocco. In fact, most of the military budget 
was used to pay the salaries of a chronically overstaffed officer corps. The consequence 
was the existence of an army outdated in terms of modernization and infrastructure in 
comparison to its neighbouring rivals.10 Ironically, its limited military prowess 
                                                          
7  The Algeciras Conference (January-April 1906) and the Cartagena Accords (April-May 1907) 
confirmed Spanish influence over a coastal strip of land in Northern Morocco. Even though Spain was 
firmly placed within the Anglo-French orbit, the accords were limited to the Western Mediterranean. 
Enrique ROSAS LEDEZMA: “Las declaraciones de Cartagena (1907): significación en la política exterior 
de España y repercusiones internacionales”, Cuadernos de Historia moderna and contemporánea, 2 (1981), 
pp. 213-230. 
8 Gabriel MAURA and Melchor FERNÁNDEZ ALMAGRO: Por qué cayó Alfonso XIII, Madrid, Ambos 
Mundos, 1948, pp. 472-473; Maura to Dato (4, 29 August 1914), Real Academia de la Historia (RAH), 
Eduardo Dato’s Papers (AED), prime ministers, nos. 328-329. 
9 Manuel AZAÑA: Los motivos de la Germanofilia, Madrid, Helénica, 1917, p. 18. 
10 In 1900, there were 499 generals, 578 colonels and over 23,000 officers for some 80,000 troops in the 
Spanish armed forces (six times more officers than in France which had a standing army of 180,000 
soldiers). Gabriel CARDONA: El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la guerra civil, Madrid: Siglo 
XXI, 1983, pp. 10-12. 
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eliminated the danger of facing pressures to enter the war. In a detailed study, the 
British military attaché Jocelyn Grant concluded that the state of the Spanish army, 
whose capacity he compared to that of Romania, was so pitiful that it did not constitute 
a threat to anyone with the possible exception of Portugal.11 
 When hostilities broke out, neutrality enjoyed a vast consensus across the 
political spectrum. Apart from the anticipated discrepancies (the ultra-clerical 
Carlists supported Germany and some republicans such as Alejandro Lerroux sided 
with the Allies and, in the process, landed the Spanish government in some 
embarrassing situations),12 the distant powder-barrel of the Balkans was an alien 
affair to the general interests of the country. From socialists to Catalan regionalists 
expressed their opposition to any type of intervention.13 The British Ambassador, 
Arthur Hardinge, recognized that neutrality was Spain’s most logical stance.14 
 Nevertheless, neutrality did not isolate Spain from the war theatre. Due to its 
role as supplier of the belligerents and their many abandoned markets, the country’s 
mining concerns and industrial sectors (textile, metallurgy, chemistry, consumer 
goods, etc.), commercial enterprises and financial ventures, experienced a 
spectacular boom.15 According to Josep Maria de Sagarra, Barcelona enjoyed 
unprecedented profitable times as a result of war.16 Industrial barons, speculators, 
financial tycoons and fleet owners amassed fortunes often later squandered in 
gambling, leisure, jewellery, property, etc.17 However, as Raymond Carr suggested, 
the sudden prosperity contributed to expose the faults in its social structure.18 The 
                                                          
11 Dispatch of Jocelyne Grant (9 January 1917), National Archives (NA), Foreign Office Papers (FO) 371, 
3030/11,488. 
12 Hardinge to Grey on the difficult circumstances created by the noisy support of Lerroux’s Radical 
Party (3 November 1914), FO 371, 2106/69,755; Hardinge informs Grey of Dato’s anger after being 
informed that Lerroux had demanded £120,000 to the British Embassy in order to distribute bribes amongst 
the ministers (1 February 1915), FO 371, 2469/15,366. David Martínez Fiol: `Lerrouxistas en pie de 
guerra', Historia 16, 174 (1990), pp. 24-26. 
13 The socialist stance is in Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Archivo Amaro del Rosal, Historia de la UGT, August 
1914, and El Socialista, 4 August 1914. For Catalan regionalism see La Veu de Catalunya, 19 August 1914. On 
the initial consensus see Francisco J. ROMERO SALVADÓ: España…, pp. 7-8. 
14 Hardinge to Grey (9 November 1914), FO 371, 2104/72,570. 
15 José Luis GARCÍA DELGADO: La modernización económica en la España de Alfonso XIII, Madrid, Espasa, 
2002, pp. 106-136. 
16 Josep Maria DE SAGARRA: Memorias, Noguer, Barcelona, 1957, p. 572. 
17 Pedro GUAL: Memorias de un industrial de nuestro tiempo, Barcelona, Sociedad General, 1923, pp. 118-
121. 
18 Raymond CARR: España, 1808-1975, Oxford, OUP, 1982, p. 497. 
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lethal combination of opulence and misery drastically altered the traditional fabric of 
society.19 Indeed, most of the population suffered a dramatic worsening of its living 
standards and a significant loss of purchasing power due to galloping inflation and 
shortages of staple products. Also, the demographic blast produced by the avalanche 
of cheap labour from the poorer southern rural areas searching for work in the 
booming industrial centres, especially Barcelona, brought about the resulting sequels 
of squalor, overcrowding and misery.20 
 Although the socio-economic consequences of the war are well-known, its 
cultural impact has received much less scholarly attention.21 Authors differ as to 
whether it remained confined to the urban elites or whether it permeated ample 
sectors of society.22 Witnesses of the events revealed how discussions around 
neutrality generated family divisions, destroyed long-lasting friendships and caused 
quarrels in the workplace.23 The philias and phobias mirrored at a national scale the 
transcendental values associated with the warring sides.24 According to Gerald 
Meaker, the ideological debate acquired the character of a dialectical civil war 
between two opposite views on the future of Spain. In general, social groups and 
institutions marked by their conservatism (landowners, army officers, court, Church) 
supported the Central Powers since they appeared to symbolize the fundamental 
principles that they wanted to see consolidated in Spain, namely, tradition, 
authority, and social hierarchy. Within the pro-German camp two groups lived side 
by side: those who admired the industrial and military might of Germany and those 
who, above all, wanted to see Britain and France humiliated for a number of 
historical affronts (War of Independence, Gibraltar). By contrast, the liberal 
professions, intellectuals, republicans and socialists identified themselves with the 
Allies, in particular France, the model of a secular and democratic nation that they 
                                                          
19 Francisco J. ROMERO SALVADÓ: Foundations…, pp. 26-28. 
20 Chris EALHAM: Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937, London, Routledge, 2005, pp. 6-9;  
21 Maximiliano FUENTES CODERA, España…, p. 19. 
22 Ibid., p. 35, suggests that its impact affected all social levels. On the contrary, Gerald MEAKER (“A 
Civil…”, p. 5) claims that the masses, unlike the elites, did not understand the war and regarded with 
indifference the ideological debate. Fernando GARCÍA SANZ (España…, p. 45) also concluded that it 
only affected minority sectors. 
23 Josep Maria DE SAGARRA, Memorias…p. 553; Pedro GUAL: Memorias…, pp. 102-103. 
24 Manuel ESPADAS BURGOS: “España…”, p. 107. 
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wished to emulate.25 Nevertheless, as Fuentes Codera suggests, there were 
numerous contradictions. The Carlist pretender to the throne (Don Jaime) was a 
staunch supporter of the Allied cause. The intellectuals, including conservatives 
such as Álvaro Alcalá Galiano, were predominantly favourable to the Allies, in the 
hope that European influence could extract Spain from its decadence. However, 
there was also a significant minority of progressive authors who sided with 
Germany, including Jacinto Benavente, who always stressed the efficiency of that 
country’s state socialism and, Pío Baroja, who paradoxically believed that a German 
victory was the best means to destroy Spanish clericalism.26 
 As the war dragged on, neutrality began to acquire different connotations.27 
Two other southern European countries, Portugal and Italy, which had remained 
neutral at the outbreak of the war, ultimately decided to join the conflict on the side 
of the western democracies. Italy, as a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany 
and Austro-Hungary, was pledged to stay at least neutral if one her allies declared 
war on another country. However, after conducting secret negotiations with the 
Allies, behind the back of its parliament and public opinion, the government decided 
to switch sides and enter the war mostly for strategic and opportunist reasons: the 
secret treaty of London (26 April 1915) stipulated that after victory Italy was to 
receive all the Dalmatian coast and the so-called terra irredenta or those areas under 
Austrian control mostly inhabited by Italians (Trieste, Tirol and Trentino). Portugal 
was not part of the two opposite blocs and thus remained neutral in the summer of 
1914. Nevertheless, it enjoyed a long-standing alliance with Great Britain. Growing 
skirmishes between German and Portuguese colonial troops in southwestern Africa, 
German naval warfare against neutral shipping and British prompting finally in 
February 1916 led the Portuguese government to seize the Central Powers’ ships that 
                                                          
25  Gerald MEAKER: “A Civil…”, pp. 1-37; Fernando DÍAZ PLAJA: Francófilos…, pp. 24-25; Jesús 
LONGARES ALONSO: “Germanófilos y aliadófilos españoles en la Primera Guerra Mundial”, Tiempo 
de Historia, 21 (1976); pp. 42-45; Secret Reports (2 February and 17 April 1916), FO 371, 2471/20,576 y 
73,963. 
26 See works by Maximiliano FUENTES CODERA: España…, pp. 34, 100-102; and, “Germanófilos y 
neutralistas: proyectos tradicionalistas y regeneracionistas para España (1914-1918)”, Ayer, 91 (2013), 
pp. 63-92; Javier VARELA, “Los intelectuales españoles ante la Gran Guerra”, Claves de razón práctica, 
88 (1998), pp. 27-37. 
27 Maximiliano FUENTES CODERA: España…, p. 47. 
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had sought refuge in Portuguese causing an automatic declaration of war by 
Germany. The entry in the struggle of Italy and Portugal (May 1915 and March 1916 
respectively) left the Spanish coasts and borders literally surrounded by the Allies. 
Consequently, those favourable to the cause of the Entente began to demand a 
departure from strict neutrality, a greater compromise with the western powers, or, 
in some cases, the rupture of relations with the Central Powers. The pro-German 
sectors, aware of the military suicide that joining the war on the side of Germany 
would entail, became the most ardent defenders of strict neutrality which they 
described as defending national independence. 
Neutrality under Question 
The Dato cabinet was able to successfully maintain a strict neutrality. His fall was 
therefore regretted by both warring camps. In fact, Hardinge even feared that the 
arrival of a new government, more openly favourable to the Allies but whose ability 
to act would be precluded by the political reality, could be a source of future 
problems.28 This would be the case after the return to office in December 1915 of 
Count Romanones, the leader of the other dynastic party (the Liberals), and the great 
exception within a governing class determined to abide by neutrality at any cost. 
 A classic stereotype of the ruling politician in Restoration Spain, Romanones, 
whose biography has been clinically studied by Javier Moreno Luzón,29 surprised 
everybody, on 19 August 1914, when his mouthpiece, El Diario Universal, published 
an article entitled “Neutralidades que matan” (Fatal Neutralities) that criticized the 
existing strict neutrality. Without openly advocating intervention, he claimed that 
for economic and geopolitical reasons Spain should stand clearly in the orbit of the 
Allies, her natural partners or otherwise the country would be marginalized in the 
future peace conference.30 This initiative challenged the official consensus.31 Aware 
of the outrage he had unleashed, the ever-cunning Romanones declared his total 
identification with the government and immediately produced a new article to 
                                                          
28 Hardinge to Grey (10 December 1915), FO 371, 2469/188,410. 
29 Javier MORENO LUZÓN: Romanones. Caciquismo y política liberal, Madrid, Alianza, 1998. 
30 According to ROMANONES (Notas de una vida, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 1999, p. 379), he wrote his article 
while enjoying his favourite pastime shooting partridges. 
31 Francisco J. ROMERO SALVADÓ: “Fatal…”, p. 295. 
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“rectify misunderstandings”: neutrality should not amount to indifference but 
anyone who sheltered any belligerent purpose had simply lost his mind.32 
 During Romanones’ period in office, the mobilization of three key social 
sectors accelerated the crisis of hegemony of the regime. During the second half of 
1916, the campaign by national industrial and commercial interests led by the Lliga 
Regionalista de Catalunya (Lliga) destroyed the grandiose economic plans of 
Finance minister, Santiago Alba, since these plans were to be mainly sustained 
through an extraordinary tax on war profits. The gravity of the social crisis made 
possible a historic labour pact in July between the two main trade unions – the 
socialist Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) and the anarcho-syndicalist 
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT). Finally, army officers, up to the rank of 
colonel, began to establish a sort of military trade union, Juntas Militares de Defensa, 
with the objective of protecting the collective interests of the corps. Simultaneously, 
the neutrality debate entered a critical phase.33 
 Despite several public declarations of adherence to the status quo,34 
Romanones attempted surreptitiously to abandon strict neutrality. Practically in 
control of Foreign Affairs, which was run by his friend Amalio Gimeno, he avoided 
parliamentary scrutiny and relied, as his private documents reveal, on the secret 
channels of diplomacy through ambassadors close to his views: Paris (Fernando León y 
Castillo), London (Alfonso Merry del Val), the Vatican (Fermín Calbetón), and Rome 
(Marquis of Villaurrutia). They were instructed to confirm the sympathy of the Spanish 
government for the Entente and, in turn, negotiate territorial concessions in order to 
facilitate the task of altering the existing neutrality. The main objective was Tangier, 
then under international statute, which, according to Romanones was “our main 
concern… and the vital condition to secure control of our Protectorate in Morocco”.35 
However, his plans collided with reality. 
                                                          
32 “The Neutrality Question”, El Imparcial, 4 September 1914. 
33 An analysis of this period can be found in Francisco J. ROMERO SALVADÓ: “The Great War…”, pp. 
893-914. 
34 See his declarations in parliament (10 May, 6 June, 13 October, 4 November 1916). 
35 Romanones to León y Castillo (25 January, 23 February, 23 March, 30 June 1916), and to Merry del Val 
(24 January 1916), RAH, Count Romanones’ Papers (ACR), II I A. 
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 To his chagrin, León y Castillo and Merry del Val agreed that Spain was 
perceived in the western chancelleries as a country dominated by clerical and pro-
German institutions whereas the presence of a friendly administration was only a 
temporary affair. Furthermore, they did not see any reason to offer concessions in 
exchange for mere displays of rhetorical friendship.36 Additionally, the entry of Italy 
and Portugal in the war had greatly diminished Spain’s strategic value, since Spain 
was already well-anchored in their geopolitical and economic orbit. Consequently, 
they were only prepared to listen to concrete proposals.37 In fact, Spain, whose 
economic resources were effectively mobilized at the service of the Entente, became 
de facto “a neutral ally”. Between the spring of 1917 and June 1918, several 
commercial treaties were signed with Great Britain, France and the United States. 
Spain secured crucial supplies of coal and oil and exported essential products for the 
Allied war effort: minerals, textiles, food-stuffs, and manufactured goods.38 
Nevertheless, given the geographic situation and the enormity of its wartime profits, 
it is impossible to ignore the significance of Germany’s ability to perpetuate Spain’s 
neutral stance and therefore the success of her active interference in Spanish affairs. 
 From 1916, Spain became a real theatre of operations. García Sanz suggests 
that Spain had the dubious honour of being the first place where a large-scale 
intelligence war took place.39 Updating Carden’s pioneering work on Germany’s 
activities in Spain during the Great War, Rosenbusch’s research confirms their 
extraordinary scope.40 Not only were Germany’s subversive operations far vaster than 
those of its enemies but also the impunity with which they were carried out produced 
constant complaints from the Entente whose own initiatives were initially hampered 
                                                          
36  León y Castillo to Romanones (5 February, 22 April, 8 May 1916), ACR, II I A; Merry del Val to 
Romanones, ACR, 42/3 (1 December 1916); Merry del Val to Alfonso XIII (25 August 1916), Archivo 
General del Palacio Real, Sección Reinado de Alfonso XIII (AGPR), 16,231/2. 
37 Grey to Hardinge (31 March 1916), FO 371, 2711/58,754. Conversations between Grey and Cambon (28 
October, 11 November 1916), FO 371, 2412/160,862 and 166,839. 
38 Jean-Marc DELAUNAY: “España trabajó por la victoria”, Historia 16, 63 (1981), pp. 19-20; José Antonio 
MONTERO JIMÉNEZ: “Diplomacia económica y balanza de pagos. Los pactos hispano-estadounidenses 
de 1918”, Revista de Historia Económica, 2 (2008), pp. 254-259. On “neutral ally”, see Javier PONCE 
MARRERO: Canarias…, p. 92. 
39 Fernando GARCÍA SANZ: España…, p. 70. 
40 Anne ROSENBUSCH: Spanish-German Relations during the First World War, Doctoral Thesis, National 
University of Ireland Maynooth (2014), pp. 197-256. 
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by a lack of coordination. Eventually, the Allies established efficient counter-espionage 
networks, resourceful coastal vigilance services and implemented all sort of measures, 
including veiled military threats, to force the Spanish authorities to act.41 
 The objective of the Central Powers was to secure that Spain’s neutral status 
remained unchanged and, to protect their various interests (economic investments and 
nearly 100 ships – 70 German and 25 Austrian – that had sought refuge in Spanish 
harbours at the start of the war)42 while harming those of the Allies. In order to 
achieve its purposes, Germany practiced the strategy of the carrot and the stick. 
 The carrot consisted of constant flattery together with territorial promises to 
Spain which depending on the moment included Gibraltar, Portugal and even part 
of the French North African Empire.43 Germany had ample room to manoeuvre. 
Unlike the Italian case, a country which coveted territory that was then part of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany could promise territories to Spain that did not 
belong to her or her allies. Given its geographic situation, Spain could not seriously be 
tempted to enter the war on the side of Germany, however Berlin could portray itself 
as a generous friend and embarrass Allied diplomats, who were clearly thrown off 
balance when either Spanish politicians or the king, reacting to Germany's territorial 
blandishments, approached them with demands that they should match these offers. 
The Allies were then faced with the dilemma of either rejecting any territorial re-
settlement, thereby confirming the idea of being the historic enemies of Spain, or 
surrendering valuable territory merely to secure Spanish gratitude.44 
 As far as the stick goes, under the military attaché (Major Arnold von Kalle), 
and the naval attaché (Captain Hans von Krohn), Germany carried out a vast 
intelligence campaign. Their spy networks enrolled the services of all kinds of 
                                                          
41 Two crucial books on this subject are Eduardo GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA and Paul AUBERT: Nidos..., 
and Fernando GARCÍA SANZ: España… 
42 List of German and Austrian ships in Spanish ports can be seen in ACR, 10/12. 
43 According to ROMANONES (Notas…, pp. 385-386), the German ambassador promised Dato, Tangiers, 
Gibraltar, and Portugal in exchange for Spanish aid. Examples of other offers can be found in Ron M. 
CARDEN, German…, pp. 96-99. The Austrian ambassador, Prince Karl von Fürstenberg, confirmed to 
Alfonso XIII the support of his country for a Spanish Tangier (18 April 1915), AGPR, 15,252/9. See also, 
secret reports (5 February 1915, 17 March 1916), FO 371, 2470/4,004 y 2761/31,988. 
44 The tensions sowed by German offers can be seen in “Conversation of Alfonso XIII with French 
diplomats” (15 March 1915), FO 371, 2470/29,500; “Conversations of Alfonso XIII with Russian 
Ambassador” (25 May 1916), FO 371, 2412/65.976. 
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characters (prostitutes, waiters, dancers, police agents, anarchists, etc.), especially in the 
main urban centres, the coasts, the borders, and the islands in order to sabotage the 
production of goods destined for the Allies.45 They informed on the sea routes and 
departures of merchant vessels so that these could be intercepted by submarines. On 17 
August 1915, El Isidoro was the first Spanish ship sunk. From the second half of 1916, 
submarine activities in Spanish waters increased significantly, particularly on the 
Mediterranean coast and around the Canary Islands.46 German agents also fostered the 
insurrection in French Morocco, often acting from the Spanish zone with the 
benevolence, if not the complicity, of the Spanish colonial authorities.47 Such 
complicity acquired scandalous dimensions in Equatorial Guinea where the 
authorities openly fraternized with interned German officers, after their withdrawal 
from Cameroon, who remained armed and were actively planning military 
operations. Only after strong pressure was exerted, including the dispatch of French 
cruisers, were they deported to the mainland.48 
 German efforts also preceded and had a greater impact than those of the Allies 
in the vital matter of controlling the press. The rising costs due to the shortage of paper 
facilitated the purchase of newspapers. In total, some 500 local and national 
publications, from different ideological leanings (conservative, republican and 
anarchist) fell under their influence. Consequently, any challenge to strict neutrality 
was described as treason by the patriotic right-wing press or as an attempt to drag the 
proletariat into an imperialist war by the left.49 
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 Rosenbusch notes that an all-out campaign to topple Romanones, led by the 
German ambassador, Prince Max von Ratibor, began in September 1916 and it was 
formally supported by Berlin in December.50 The key moment came when the Spanish 
prime minister rejected the German peace offer of 12 December 1916,51 sided with the 
Allies and even criticized Germany’s contempt for international rules with its 
submarine activities.52 The pro-German press justified the use of its submarines as a 
necessary means to secure German survival while accusing Romanones of seeking to 
push Spain into the war due to his vast economic interests; the very same economic 
interests that triggered the inflation and shortages that were devastating the country.53 
In early January 1917, El País revealed that French intelligence services had intercepted 
cables from Ratibor asking Berlin for more funds to overthrow the Spanish 
government.54 
 The duel between Romanones and Germany only permitted two possible 
outcomes: the rupture of diplomatic relations or the prime minister’s fall.55 On 16 
February, a suspicious individual, who turned out to be a German sailor, was arrested 
in Cartagena with two suitcases full of explosives, fuses, and propaganda. Romanones 
wrote to the Spanish ambassador in Berlin, Luis Polo de Bernabé, complaining that 
Germany did not respect neutrality. One of her sailors had been caught with enough 
dynamite to blow up all the fleets of the world and all Spanish factories.56 Following 
Germany’s announcement of the intensification of her submarine campaign, from 1 
February 1917, Romanones believed in emulating the response given by hitherto 
neutral countries such as the United States and some Latin American republics.57 
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However, aware of the daunting opposition from ruling circles, he instructed León y 
Castillo to start negotiations with the French authorities while awaiting the right 
moment to act. Nevertheless, he stressed that there was no backtracking since the 
maintenance of neutrality meant that Spain would remain a marginal country in the 
post-war world.58 
 León y Castillo proposed formally, for the first time, the rupture of relations 
with Germany, to place all the material resources and ports at the disposal of the Allies, 
to increase war production, and to seize all the ships and properties of the Central 
Powers in Spain. In return, his government wanted to open negotiations over the status 
of Gibraltar, Tangier and Portugal. At a moment in which the front was stalled and 
casualties kept mounting, the proposal was not without attraction for France since 
Spanish involvement portended an end to German activities in Morocco, free access to 
Spanish harbours and potentially hundreds of thousands of fresh troops. France 
appeared prepared to find an arrangement in Morocco but postponed its conclusion to 
the end of the war and left the questions of Gibraltar and Portugal in British hands.59 
 The British war cabinet regarded the Spanish offer as a mixed blessing. The 
Admiralty and the General Staff were well aware of the deplorable state of their 
Spanish counterparts but believed that Spain could make an important contribution in 
terms of manpower and enormous mineral resources. The Foreign Office considered 
the potential positive impact on the Catholic world but feared her demands could 
outweigh the advantages. Concerning Portugal, a future deal binding that country to 
Spain was not considered detrimental since Portuguese misgovernment was regarded 
as a persistent source of anxiety. Nevertheless, it was also noted that nothing could be 
done at the present while Portugal was an ally in the war otherwise Britain could be 
pilloried in the eyes of the world. As regards to Gibraltar, an interdepartmental 
committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Curzon, with naval, military and 
diplomatic representatives, was appointed in early April 1917 to report on its possible 
exchange for the Spanish enclave of Ceuta. Tellingly about British diplomacy, the most 
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troublesome issue was Tangier. Spain was perceived as quite incapable of governing 
the city efficiently, due to widespread corruption and glaring incompetence to hold 
onto its territories in North Africa. The Foreign Office feared that, if Tangier was to 
become Spanish, one day France could use the pretext of faltering Spanish power in the 
area to seize that city and even Spanish Morocco, which would nullify all the elaborate 
precautions taken by Britain in the past to exclude her present ally, France, from the 
northern coast of Morocco. The War Cabinet finally approved Spain’s alignment with 
the Entente and, although stressing that at this moment no territorial promises should 
be made, it instructed its diplomatic staff in Madrid to come up with suggestions. The 
Embassy Secretary, John C.T. Vaughan, proposed an offer that would extend Spanish 
Guinea northwards and restore Spanish sovereignty in the Caroline Islands.60 
 On 5 April 1917, the sinking of the steamer San Fulgencio was the decisive 
moment that persuaded Romanones to act. Germany had already destroyed over 30 
Spanish vessels,61 but this new attack was perceived as outrageous. The San Fulgencio 
had been torpedoed while heading towards Spanish waters with a vital cargo of coal 
after having travelled to Newcastle with a German safe-conduct. Urged by León y 
Castillo to take a decisive step,62 Romanones replied: 
“The culminant moment has arrived. The sinking of the San Fulgencio has 
been the final straw… The route I will take is already determined in the 
direction that you have known for a long time...”63 
Romanones informed the French ambassador, Léon Geoffray, that the recent entry of 
the United States and several Latin American republics into the war had changed the 
situation. If Spain did not react now, her prestige would be sunk to the level of minor 
powers such as Holland.64 However, on 19 April he resigned prompting celebrations in 
pro-German quarters. To add insult to injury, one of Germany’s most vociferous 
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mouthpieces, La Acción, depicted Romanones with his heart pierced by a sword named 
neutrality in a cartoon sarcastically titled “Fatal Neutralities”.65 
Alfonso XIII’s Neutrality 
In reality, Spain’s neutrality was never at risk. Romanones did not have the support 
of the general staff, most of the governing class or even his own party. Tellingly, the 
new government that replaced him was headed by a rival Liberal baron, the Marquis 
of Alhucemas, and contained half of the previous ministers, though it is important to 
bear in mind that Romanones’ resignation was due to King Alfonso XIII’s 
withdrawal of confidence.66 
 Studies of Alfonso XIII reveal how since his coronation in May 1902, his quest 
for playing an active role in politics and his siding with his army officers in their 
conflicts with politicians helped undermine the foundations of the constitutional 
order.67 Furthermore, in Restoration Spain, a narrow clique of crown, prime 
ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, and a few diplomats monopolized 
international relations. With Alfonso XIII, keen on assuming the role of privileged 
spokesperson with foreign ambassadors, international relations became almost his 
private domain.68 
 During the Great War, amidst a court dominated by his mother, the Austrian 
Archduchess Maria Christina of Habsburg, and his wife, the English Princess Victoria 
Eugénie of Battenberg, King Alfonso XIII was initially sympathetic towards the 
Allies.69 His inclinations seemed to coincide with those of Romanones who wrote that 
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“Fatal Neutralities” reflected the views of the sovereign.70 Both of them perceived the 
war as a golden opportunity to gain international prestige and obtain territorial 
concessions. Nostalgic for a fading era of imperial splendour,71 he cultivated good 
relations with the Entente in order to expand Spain’s influence in North Africa and 
neighbouring Portugal, after the instability following the ousting of King Manuel II 
of Braganza and the proclamation of a republic in October 1910.72 With intervention 
precluded by the precarious state of Spain’s armed forces, he became enthused with 
the idea of championing a mediated peace. In July 1915, he established an Oficina 
Pro-Cautivos (Bureau for Prisoners) in the royal palace to gather information on missing 
citizens and soldiers, act on behalf of the population in occupied territories and 
perform other altruistic services such as prisoner’ exchanges, repatriations, and 
concessions of pardons. Simultaneously, Spain took on the role of representing the 
interests of the belligerents in enemy countries.73 
 The harmony between monarch and prime minister soon began to break 
down. The enemies of the crown’s (republicans and socialists) identification with the 
Entente, the Allies’ constant snub of Spanish demands vis-à-vis German flattery (and 
crucially the close relations between Alfonso XIII and the military attaché Kalle) 
transformed the king’s sympathies.74 The arrival in Cartagena, in June 1916, of a 
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German submarine (U-35), responsible for numerous attacks in the Mediterranean, 
illustrated the monarch’s changing attitude. The U-35’s officers, who were feted as 
heroes by the local authorities, were the bearers of the Kaiser’s personal message of 
gratitude to the Spanish sovereign for the excellent treatment received by his troops 
in Spanish Guinea. In fact, the initiative had begun with Alfonso XIII who in 
February had told Kalle that such a deed would cause a great impression upon 
public opinion and would leave Romanones speechless. After the avalanche of 
protests by the western powers, aware that the U-35 had passed on instructions to 
the crews of several German ships sheltered in Cartagena and even collected some 
sailors and weapons to carry out new operations, the government decreed that any 
future submarine arriving in a Spanish harbour would be interned unless due to 
major technical failure or bad weather.75 
 The reaction towards Germany’s peace offers in December 1916 intensified 
the animosity between Romanones and the monarch. Encouraged by the Kaiser, 
Alfonso XIII believed that his moment of glory had finally arrived. His journey to 
Vienna to attend the funeral of the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph provided him 
with the opportunity to meet the leaders of the Central Powers and then on his 
return home to undertake negotiations with the Allies in Paris.76 The latter’s rejection 
shocked him but even worse was Romanones’ opposition to his trip and even to his 
wearing Austrian uniform during the private ceremony held in memory of Franz 
Joseph in Madrid.77 
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 In April 1917, the king sealed his prime minister’s fate. The rupture with 
Germany shattered his dream of being the arbiter of peace. But, above all, Tsar 
Nicholas II’s downfall unleashed panic in the royal palace as well as enthusiasm 
amongst his pro-Allied enemies who now could convincingly argue that the war 
was a clash between democracy and autocratic monarchies. Indeed, one month 
earlier, on 27 March, the UGT and the CNT, euphoric after the Russian events, had 
agreed to a manifesto indicating the need to launch a revolutionary general strike to 
oust the oligarchic regime presiding over Spain’s social misery.78 Editorials in El 
Socialista stressed that Spain should follow Russia’s lead, liquidate its decadent 
monarchy, and join the Allies.79 Simultaneously, to Alfonso XIII’s horror, the Entente 
seemed to have soon forgotten the Tsar’s fate and quickly recognized the new 
provisional government in Russia. 
Between War and Revolution 
Apart from another critical moment at the end of the conflict, the neutrality issue 
gradually lost importance before the worsening domestic situation. In his pioneering 
work, Juan Antonio Lacomba suggests the crisis of 1917 in Spain consisted of three 
different phases: a praetorian insurrection in June led by the Juntas Militares de 
Defensa; a bourgeois revolution in July embodied by the establishment of an 
assembly of republican, Catalan regionalists and socialist parliamentarians with the 
object of initiating a thorough constitutional reform; and a proletarian revolution in 
August that was crushed by the army. Although accurate in chronological terms, 
such a thesis relies excessively on socio-economic determinism and overshadows the 
complexity of a process that transcended that historical framework. Furthermore, it 
overlooks the extent to which the origins and outcome of the crisis were closely 
linked to the international context and ignores the existence of a parallel phase of 
governmental reaction wherein neutrality itself was effectively exploited by the 
regime.80 
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 Romanones’ initiatives after his downfall and the monarch’s subsequent 
reaction lit the fuse. Firstly, the prime minister’s resignation note constituted a subtle 
attack on the crown. He claimed he had to leave office due to the lack of support 
from his party and the general public. And yet, it was evident that in Restoration 
Spain the king, and not public opinion, determined the fate of cabinets. A leading 
republican newspaper commented that the note was worthy of a good statesman but 
not of a palace lackey.81 Secondly, on 27 May, Romanones helped finance a mass pro-
Allied gathering of nearly 25,000 people. There, republicans and intellectuals, such as 
Miguel de Unamuno, stressed that neutrality was a shameful surrender of national 
dignity and vented their anger against Alfonso XIII, described as the chief of the 
German cause in Spain, who soon would end like his cousin Nicholas II.82 
 Terrified by the events in Russia and the situation in Spain, a frantic king 
ordered the war minister, General Manuel Aguilera, to dissolve the Juntas.83 He drew 
an erroneous parallel between the Spanish officers and their Tsarist counterparts who 
had just advised their sovereign to abdicate. His decision triggered a revolutionary 
process. On 1 June, the Juntas’ defiance culminated in an ultimatum: the government 
was given 12 hours to free their leaders who had been arrested after refusing to obey 
orders to disband their unions; to offer guarantees of no future reprisals; and to 
recognize their official statutes. Otherwise they would take matters in their own 
hands.84 
 The Alhucemas cabinet resigned after barely two months in office. Amidst the 
general disappointment, the king offered power to Eduardo Dato following the 
traditional rotation of the two dynastic parties as if these were normal times. A 
mainstream Madrid newspaper published an editorial entitled: “The Revolution has 
begun.”85 However, faced with the euphoria of the regime’s enemies, and spurred by 
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the praetorian rebellion, Dato proved more cunning than many had expected and took 
a reckless gamble. He hoped to lure the proletariat into carrying out its threat of a 
general strike. Confronted with the spectre of revolution, the scared middle classes 
would stop supporting any reformist schemes, the army would quell the disturbances, 
and the government could then claim to be the guarantor of law and order and the 
saviour of neutrality.86 In order to succeed, the Dato cabinet endorsed a campaign of 
deceit and manipulation of public opinion whereby its enemies were accused of being 
financed by foreign gold in order to launch a revolution, proclaim the republic, and 
enter the war on the side of the Allies.87 
 In fact, the western powers never planned to topple the Spanish monarchy. 
However, republican and socialist pro-Allied rhetoric seemed to give authenticity to 
the idea. Alfonso XIII was fully convinced.88 And ironically, while the Entente, which 
was reliant on the regular supply of Spain’s mineral resources for its war effort, wished 
for political stability and averted any close identification with its Spanish left-wing 
supporters, Germany, the beacon of monarchist Spain, promoted social agitation and 
industrial unrest. According to French intelligence services, Germany sought to harm 
the Anglo-French interests in countries such as Russia and Spain in concert with close 
conservative groups or by fostering revolutionary movements.89 
 The Russian events facilitated the task of fitting the Entente into the role of 
promoters of the revolution. The pro-German press spread ludicrous rumours about 
British gold financing an insurrection against the monarchy. They even accused the 
very conservative British ambassador, Arthur Hardinge, of pulling the strings of a 
subversive plot as his colleague George Buchanan had done in Petrograd.90 The case of 
Greece where Anglo-French pressures had ensured the fall of the pro-German King 
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Constantine I, who was married to a sister of the Kaiser, seemed to bear out that 
thesis.91 An overwhelmed Hardinge wrote to Alfonso XIII emphatically denying any 
sort of contact with revolutionaries “of the Lenin type, well known for their sympathies 
for Germany”.92 The British ambassador also published (under the by-line of “An 
Allied Diplomat”) an article entitled “Spain and the Allied Interests” in which he 
argued that his side, containing several monarchies, wanted a strong Spain and not 
one torn apart by civil strife, which would threaten the precious supply of minerals 
and other goods vital for its war effort.93 Hardinge even offered Dato his services to 
discover the truth behind the rumours and due to his insistence the British cabinet 
declared twice in the House of Commons its utter opposition to Spain’s forced entry 
into the war.94 
 Initially, the government’s plan proved successful: it took advantage of the 
outbreak of a violent railway dispute in Valencia to entice the labour movement to 
launch the revolutionary strike. In fact, the UGT first threatened with endorsing a 
solidarity strike of the whole sector on 10 August. Nevertheless, it sought until the 
last moment a compromise, but all its attempts met with the company’s intransigence; 
an attitude that was encouraged by the government. In short, the UGT was given a 
stark choice: accept utter defeat or go along with the strike announced for 10 August. 
Finally, on 13 August, the socialists staged a revolutionary strike that was brutally 
crushed by the army.95 Promises of economic improvements together with the rumours 
of foreign gold behind the disturbances persuaded the officers that it was better to 
shoot fellow workers in Spain than to dig trenches in France.96 However, the 
government’s victory was short-lived and its strategy helped undermine the 
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foundations of the constitutional order. Aware that they had been manipulated to 
suppress a revolt that the Dato cabinet had itself provoked, on 26 October, the army 
corps approved a message that was submitted to the king demanding the removal of 
the existing administration. In return, the officers guaranteed the dissolution (by force, 
if necessary) of any new parliament that could represent a challenge to the dynasty.97 
 With both dynastic parties utterly fragmented and ousted from office by the 
military in the last few months, the turno pacífico (peaceful rotation) between 
Conservatives and Liberals was shattered. The power vacuum lasted a record eight 
days until the formation of a monarchist coalition that was presided over by 
Alhucemas and comprised members of diverse dynastic factions and included, for 
the first, time, two Catalan regionalists. Tellingly, the Juntas were also directly 
represented by Juan de la Cierva, leader of a small group on the right of the 
Conservative Party, as war minister.98 
Neutrality’s Agony 
During the last year of the war, the impact of the Bolshevik triumph and the socio-
economic dislocation brought about the breakdown of the belligerent countries’ 
internal fronts. The Central Powers, although seemingly benefitting from the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 that left Russia out of the war, collapsed in autumn. The 
Allies managed to withstand the last German spring offensive and achieve victory 
largely due to the invaluable material and ideological support provided by the entry of 
the United States in the war. 
 In March 1918, besieged by food riots, strikes and the ever-pending threat of 
praetorian intervention, the Alhucemas cabinet gave way to a national government 
presided over by Antonio Maura, which included the main barons of all the dynastic 
factions – including Dato (Foreign Affairs), Alhucemas (Home Office), Alba 
(Education) and Romanones (Justice) – and the Lliga’s leader, Francesc Cambó (Public 
Works).99 Even though its raison d’être was the grave domestic situation, the 
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pompously named Cabinet of Titans was dragged into the international question. By 
the time of the armistice, Spain’s neutrality had been preserved but its status had 
been clearly devalued. 
 Throughout 1918, the increasingly better-coordinated Allied intelligence 
services began to win their particular battle in Spain, as several German spy 
networks were exposed. 100 Even the direct collusion between the German Embassy 
and anarchist groups in Madrid was revealed.101 Much larger was the organization 
based in the Catalan capital led by the enigmatic Baron Rolland, a Turkish national 
whose real name was Isaac Ezraty. His payroll included a former secretary of the 
CNT, Francisco Roldán, and the chief of police, Manuel Bravo Portillo, whose 
activities ranged from providing information on the departure of vessels to facilitate 
submarine operations, to sabotaging factories working for the Allies and even 
engaging in assassination attempts against factory owners.102 When questioned by 
the king about the truth of the news, Kalle had to admit that it was correct in regards 
to Barcelona. But there had never been any plan to damage Spain’s national 
interests.103 
 Faced with the avalanche of revelations, the government response was 
baffling. On 4 July, the parliament surreptitiously introduced a Law of Espionage. 
Henceforth, the penalty for collaboration with foreign agents could lead to 
imprisonment or a fine ranging from 500 to 20,000 pesetas. But the publication or 
circulation of any news contrary to the security or neutrality of the nation or harmful to 
a foreign power, chief of a foreign state or diplomatic representative, could lead to 
imprisonment or a fine ranging from 500 to 100,000 pesetas. In brief, it punished less 
the spy than the one who exposed him. Given the timing of the law, and despite 
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Romanones’ assurances to the Allies, it was perceived as a gag order for the press 
aimed at avoiding an embarrassing situation with Germany.104 
 Finally, the escalation of submarine attacks on Spanish vessels appeared to end 
the government’s passivity. Like the sinking of the San Fulgencio in April of the 
previous year, the decisive moment this time was the torpedoing of the steamer Ramón 
de Larriñaga, travelling from New York with a vital cargo of oil, and was just about to 
enter Spanish waters on 13 July. Eight members of the crew died. Maura confided to 
Dato that such shocking brutality had surpassed the limits of his patience. The country 
demanded a stern sign of resolution without delay. Maura also told his son Gabriel 
that Spain’s dignity was at stake.105 Finally, after long deliberations, the cabinet agreed 
on 10 August to send a note of protest to Germany. It amounted to a mild-mannered 
ultimatum: Spain stressed its commitment to neutrality but also warned that effective 
means for ensuring the maintenance of its maritime trade and protecting the lives of its 
sailors needed to be adopted. Consequently, in the event of any fresh torpedoing, the 
tonnage sunk would be replaced by a similar amount obtained from German or 
Austrian ships lying in Spanish ports.106 The ministers were dumbfounded when 
Germany replied that the implementation of such a measure would equate to casus belli 
and in the space of 10 days two other Spanish ships were sunk.107 The choice was stark: 
to carry out the ultimatum and seize tonnage was to risk war while the alternative was 
a humiliating retreat. 
 Neutrality ultimately prevailed due to a combination of facts. Fearing being 
dragged into a conflict the government dreaded, Dato explored the attitude of the 
Allies. With victory within their sight, the latter had no interest in offering any 
incentives to Spain to enter the war in its final moments and therefore merely stated 
that it was up to her to take the necessary measures to safeguard her dignity.108 Also 
crucially, neither the monarch nor the armed forces were prepared to abandon 
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neutrality as was made clear in the council of ministers of 31 August by Admiral 
Augusto Miranda, the Navy minister. That day, Natalio Rivas wrote in his diary: “the 
king is prepared to sack all his ministers in order to defend neutrality”. A few days 
later, Dato confirmed to Maura that the monarch had said that under no circumstances 
was he prepared to permit a departure from strict neutrality.109 The ambassador in 
Berlin, the openly pro-German Polo de Bernabé, declined all responsibility and 
submitted his resignation, which, tellingly, was not accepted by the king.110 With little 
room to manoeuvre, the only choice was to find a formula which could permit 
everybody to save face, something facilitated by the conciliatory tone of the Spanish 
government and the negotiating attitude of the German Foreign Office in light of the 
rapidly crumbling war effort. On 13 October, Ratibor confirmed the loan of 6 ships to 
supply those sunk since the drafting of the note. The Maura administration hastened to 
confirm that the deal was the product of a friendly agreement.111 According to a 
leading notable of the Conservative Party, Manuel Burgos y Mazo, the general 
impression vis-à-vis the agreement was deplorable and caused dismay in the western 
capitals.112 
 The preservation of neutrality allowed Spain to avoid human bloodletting and 
to conserve all her territories (including her islands and few remaining colonies). 
Nevertheless, the same neutrality that was so logic in the summer of 1914, four years 
later seemed to reflect Spain’s dismaying impotence rather than her honourable. The 
Central Powers had committed 128 attacks against Spanish vessels, destroyed 20 per 
cent of the merchant fleet (81 ships), caused the death of over 100 sailors, gravely 
threatened trade and communications, and, in brief, showed constant contempt for 
Spain through subversive activities. Not only did the coveted dream of presiding over 
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mediation never materialize, but also Spain could not leave behind her marginal status 
in the international arena. In December 1918, Romanones returned to office on the eve 
of the Peace Conference but as he had feared in “Fatal Neutralities”, there would be no 
gratitude for the neutrals in the new world order. One of the few satisfactions he 
obtained was to accomplish the expulsion of Ratibor, his previous nemesis, together 
with his close collaborators, on 9 January 1919.113 The count travelled to Paris where he 
held talks with the North American president, Woodrow Wilson, and the French prime 
minister, Georges Clemenceau. But there was no formal invitation to attend the peace 
proceedings and the Austro-German tonnage anchored in Spanish ports was seized by 
the Allies who, only after months of arduous negotiations, permitted Spain to formally 
acquire the six ceded ships, which were symbolically re-baptized with the name España 
I to VI. 
 Isolated from the winning bloc, Spain would have to face the nightmare of the 
war in Morocco without help from France, a country that could not easily forget the 
pro-German attitudes of the Spanish authorities in that colony. In the domestic realm, 
the Great War constituted a turning-point in the transition from elite to mass politics, 
and consequently, accelerated the crisis of traditional liberalism. As in the rest of 
Europe, Restoration Spain was rocked in the post-war years by a revolutionary wave 
propelled by widespread popular discontent, economic upheaval, and the Bolshevik 
example. However, as the outcome of 1917 had revealed, the real danger to the 
constitutional order was not revolution, but praetorian subversion. 
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